Executive Summary / Key Takeaways

• Zero Revenue, Mounting Losses: SUPA Consolidated (formerly Tribal Rides International) has generated no revenue since its 2014 inception, with net losses accelerating to $167,000 in the first nine months of 2025 while operating expenses ballooned sevenfold to $297,000, signaling a business with no economic engine and deteriorating cost control.

• The Pivot Parable: After abandoning property tax liens, ridesharing patents, and autonomous vehicle development, the company acquired 1,157 vending machines for $125,000 in stock—a transaction that values each machine at just $35 and suggests a desperate search for any operational footprint rather than a strategic food tech entry.

• Related-Party Red Flags: The June 2025 acquisition of SUPA Food Services involved assuming a $121,200 related-party loan and issuing 250 million shares, representing a 63% dilutive event that raises questions about transaction independence and whether the deal serves shareholders or insiders.

• Going Concern Crisis: With an accumulated deficit of $2.97 million, a working capital deficit of $961,000, and only $53,000 in cash against mounting legal and professional fees, independent auditors have expressed substantial doubt about the company's ability to continue operations without external funding that management admits it has no specific plans to secure.

• Leadership Instability: Three different CEOs in 2025—Joseph Grimes, Adam Clode, and Yessenia Hernandez—combined with a material weakness in internal controls over financial reporting, indicates a board in disarray and a company lacking the stable leadership required to execute any turnaround.

Setting the Scene: A Decade of False Starts

SUPA Consolidated Inc., incorporated in Nevada on May 19, 2014, began life as Trimax Consulting, a property tax lien marketing firm that generated no meaningful revenue for six years. This pattern of conceptual businesses without commercial traction would become the company's defining characteristic. In 2017, it rebranded as Xinda International Corp., and in 2020 made its first major pivot, acquiring Tribal Rides to develop ridesharing and autonomous vehicle software supported by two U.S. patents. For four years, the company burned cash on this venture, producing zero revenue while accumulating operating expenses.

On December 31, 2024, management sold this entire intellectual property portfolio—patents, software, prototypes, and all related intangible assets—to Boumarang Inc. for 2.91 million shares of Boumarang stock valued at $5 million. This transaction, recorded as discontinued operations, netted a small profit in 2024 but effectively admitted that four years of "development" had created a business that could not generate sales. The company then announced a strategic shift to "food technology," a vague descriptor that would soon reveal itself as a euphemism for vending machine operations.

The name changes tell their own story: from Trimax to Xinda to Tribal Rides to SUPA Consolidated, each rebranding coinciding with a new, unproven business model. This isn't evolution—it's corporate survival through reinvention, with each iteration leaving shareholders further from profitability.

Technology, Products, and Strategic Differentiation: The Vending Machine "Platform"

SUPA's current strategy centers on 1,157 commercial icewater vending machines acquired from SUPA Food Services on June 30, 2025. The company paid for this "food tech" platform by issuing 250 million shares—representing massive dilution for a business valued at only $125,000 based on the stock price at closing. The machines themselves were capitalized at $40,809, or $35 per unit, based on purchase invoices, while the remaining $84,191 of consideration was allocated to intangible assets like "customer site contracts" and "location rights."

Why does this matter? Because vending machines are a low-margin, capital-intensive commodity business with no proprietary technology. The company's description of this as a "digital transportation enablement platform" in its SEC filings reveals a management team still using tech jargon to describe a business that involves selling ice water from machines. There is no patented technology, no network effects, no scalable software—just physical assets that require maintenance, restocking, and location rental fees.

Management claims the food tech industry presents "significant opportunities driven by global demand for healthier, more sustainable, and technology-enabled food solutions." Yet the company has disclosed no unique technology, no exclusive partnerships, no proprietary supply chain, and no path to differentiate these machines from the thousands of other vending operators. The strategy appears to be: acquire any revenue-generating assets possible, regardless of strategic fit or quality, to escape the "development stage" label.

Financial Performance & Segment Dynamics: The Anatomy of a Burning Match

The financial statements read like a case study in corporate decay. For the nine months ended September 30, 2025, SUPA generated zero revenue—not a single dollar of sales from its vending machines, which remain in "pre-commercialization phase" five months after acquisition. Meanwhile, operating expenses surged to $296,882, up from $42,500 in the prior-year period, driven by "legal and professional fees" and "rental expenses" associated with the SUPA acquisition.

The net loss of $166,953 in nine months represents a 159% increase from the prior year, while the accumulated deficit reached $2.97 million by September 30, 2025. The working capital deficit expanded to $961,000, and cash stands at just $53,132—enough to cover less than three months of operations. The company has no credit facility, no committed funding sources, and management explicitly states it has "no specific plans or agreements for new funding sources."

The balance sheet reveals further distress: current ratio of 0.06, debt-to-equity of 0.15, and negative returns on assets (-5.97%) and equity (-6.03%). The $121,200 related-party loan assumed in the SUPA acquisition appears as a liability, but the company has not disclosed the loan's terms, interest rate, or repayment schedule—standard information that would be required if this were an arm's-length transaction.

What does this imply? The company is insolvent by traditional measures, surviving only by issuing shares for assets and relying on related-party financing. The vending machine acquisition was not a strategic purchase but a financial necessity to show some asset base, however minimal.

Outlook, Management Guidance, and Execution Risk: Vaporware Projections

Management's commentary offers no concrete roadmap to revenue generation. The company "intends to realign corporate strategy and resources to focus on identifying, developing, and acquiring food technology businesses and assets," but provides no timeline, no capital budget, and no performance targets. The statement that "until this transition is complete, the company will be considered in the development stage with no current operating revenues" essentially admits that management has no visibility on when—or if—the vending machines will generate sales.

The guidance is purely aspirational: "we believe the food tech industry presents significant opportunities" and "we are currently evaluating strategic partnerships, acquisitions, and product initiatives." There is no discussion of how many machines are operational, average revenue per machine, location occupancy rates, or any metric that would indicate business momentum. This is because there is no momentum.

Execution risk is extreme. The company must secure "further funding, integration efforts, and licensing approvals" just to make the vending machines operational, yet cannot articulate how much funding, what integration is required, or which licenses are needed. The leadership team has turned over completely in 2025, with the current CEO, Yessenia Hernandez, appointed on November 5, 2025—giving her less than two months to understand a business that has never generated revenue under any of its three prior CEOs.

Risks and Asymmetries: The Path to Zero

The going concern risk is existential. Independent auditors have expressed "substantial doubt about the company's ability to continue as a going concern" for two consecutive years. If SUPA cannot raise capital by Q2 2026, it will exhaust its cash and be forced to either liquidate assets (the vending machines have minimal resale value) or file for bankruptcy. The financial statements include no adjustments for this possibility, meaning asset values could be overstated.

Related-party transactions represent a critical governance failure. The SUPA acquisition involved a related-party loan and a related-party seller, yet the company provides no fairness opinion, no independent valuation, and no explanation of why 250 million shares—nearly triple the pre-deal float—was appropriate consideration. This pattern follows the Boumarang sale, where intellectual property was exchanged for shares in another thinly-traded company, creating paper value without cash proceeds.

The material weakness in internal controls, identified by CEO Yessenia Hernandez as of September 30, 2025, means financial reporting errors could go undetected. In a company with minimal staff and high leadership turnover, this increases the risk of fraud, misstatement, or simply losing track of the few assets it possesses.

Dilution risk is catastrophic. The company has issued 250 million shares for vending machines and could issue hundreds of millions more for future acquisitions. With no revenue and mounting losses, any equity raised will come at massive discounts, wiping out existing shareholders. The 12.32 beta indicates extreme volatility, but the real risk is permanent capital loss through value destruction and dilution.

Valuation Context: Pricing a Lottery Ticket

At $0.05 per share, SUPA Consolidated trades at a market capitalization of $14.54 million and an enterprise value of $15.10 million. These numbers are meaningless in the context of zero revenue and negative cash flow. Traditional metrics like P/E (nonexistent), EV/EBITDA (irrelevant with no earnings), or price-to-book (3.57x a book value of $0.01 per share) provide no insight because the underlying business has no economic value.

The price-to-operating cash flow ratio of 241.13x is based on minimal cash generation from discontinued operations, not ongoing business activity. With net losses of approximately $18,500 per month, the company is burning cash at a rate that would exhaust its $53,000 cash balance in less than three months if not for the ability to issue shares.

What matters for valuation is burn rate and dilution runway. The company lost $167,000 in nine months, or roughly $18,500 per month. At this rate, current cash covers less than three months of operations. However, the real constraint is the board's willingness to continue issuing shares for assets. The 250 million shares issued for SUPA represent 63% dilution in a single transaction. With 400 million shares authorized and unknown shares outstanding post-SUPA, the company can continue this dilutive spiral until shareholder equity is effectively zero.

Comparables are nonexistent. No legitimate food tech or vending machine operator trades at these metrics because they have actual revenue and assets. The stock trades as a speculation vehicle, its price determined by promotional activity and the hope that management will eventually find a viable business—despite a decade of evidence to the contrary.

Conclusion: The Inescapable Gravity of Zero

SUPA Consolidated is not a turnaround story; it is a liquidity trap. The company has cycled through three business models in eleven years, generating zero revenue while accumulating nearly $3 million in losses. The pivot to vending machines via a dilutive, related-party transaction demonstrates strategic desperation, not vision. With no cash, no revenue, no stable leadership, and no credible path to profitability, the company faces an existential crisis that will likely end in either massive further dilution or insolvency.

The investment thesis is binary: either management defies a decade of history and somehow extracts value from $35 vending machines, or the stock continues its inevitable drift toward zero. Given the going concern qualification, material weakness in controls, and pattern of value-destroying pivots, the latter scenario appears far more probable. For investors, this is not a calculated risk but a lottery ticket with odds heavily skewed toward total loss. The only rational framework for evaluation is speculation capital only—money one can afford to lose completely—because fundamental analysis leads to only one conclusion: this business has no economic moat, no financial foundation, and no future without a miracle.